The current negotiation process with Russia is not a path to peace; it is the continuation of war by hybrid means. The Kremlin is using it to buy time, erode Western support, and legitimize its territorial gains.
While delegations “hammer out the details,” Russian missiles continue to systematically destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in early February 2026, Russia is deliberately dragging out the talks, hoping to stretch them into the summer when Western fatigue reaches a breaking point.
Sovereignty is not a commodity or a bargaining chip
Any formula that includes “troop withdrawals,” “creating a free economic zone,” or “temporarily transferring control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant” is not a compromise. It is the legal whitewashing of aggression and occupation. In negotiations, sovereignty cannot be conditional or partial. It is either full or it does not exist.
Crimea as the point of no return: a perfect parallel with 1938
Recognizing Crimea as Russian territory would amount to the de facto dismantling of international law. The parallel with 1938 is exact. First came the Anschluss of Austria, sold as the “reunification of the German people.” Then Hitler demanded only the Sudetenland for its “ethnic Germans.” The West agreed. Then he seized the rest of Czechoslovakia. The West stayed silent. Then he invaded Poland. That is precisely how the Second World War began. Every concession only sharpened the aggressor’s appetite. Today we risk repeating the same scenario step by step if Crimea and parts of Donbas are recognized as Russian.
The south of Ukraine as the next strategic direction after the Donbas
If the Kremlin succeeds in locking in control over Donbas through negotiations or a “frozen conflict,” the next phase is likely to be a full-scale offensive against southern Ukraine – Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa regions. The objective is straightforward: secure a land corridor to Transnistria, establish a single controlled bridgehead stretching from Crimea to the Moldovan border, and cut Ukraine off entirely from the Black Sea. This would render Ukraine economically unviable as a state and give Russia unchallenged dominance over the entire Black Sea basin.
The Black Sea as the key to continental security
For decades, Western capitals have underestimated the Black Sea region, treating it as a peripheral zone between Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. The war in Ukraine has made it clear: this is one of the critical front lines of future global conflicts. Control of the Black Sea allows Russia to manipulate energy routes, disrupt trade, and exert military pressure on NATO members. It also provides a direct gateway to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, where Moscow is already deeply active.
Ukraine’s successful resistance in the Black Sea has shattered the myth of inevitable Russian supremacy. The sinking of flagship vessels and the systematic pushing back of the Russian fleet have shown that technological asymmetry can overcome numerical superiority. For the West, this matters profoundly. Ukraine has become the forward line of containment, shielding not only its own ports but NATO’s entire southern flank. Losing Ukraine would push that line dramatically westward, bringing higher energy prices, renewed vulnerability for Europe, hundreds of millions of euros in daily revenue for Russia’s war machine, and a stronger China that receives discounted Russian resources. In the end, Europe would once again find itself hostage to the Kremlin.
The Baltic states: the next stage of Russian expansion
If the Kremlin gets what it wants – a “frozen conflict” in Ukraine, partial sanctions relief, and consolidated control in the south – the Baltic states will be next in line. “Russia sees the Baltic states as the next stage after Ukraine. Hybrid operations, provocations along the Suwalki Corridor, and energy pressure are already built into its operational planning,” according to joint assessments by Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian intelligence services in February 2026.
Russian perceptions of Latvia and the other Baltic states increasingly mirror how the Kremlin viewed Ukraine on the eve of the full-scale invasion. Estonian intelligence warns that while Russia is not currently planning a direct military attack on NATO, it is actively rebuilding its forces and trying to delay Europe’s rearmament. After any ceasefire in Ukraine, Moscow could be ready for a local operation against a single neighbor within six months and for a regional war in the Baltic area within 18-24 months, creating a dangerous window of opportunity.
Russia is unlikely to begin with a full invasion. It will more likely start with hybrid escalation: sabotage operations, damage to undersea cables, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, drone incursions into airspace, “little green men,” or engineered migration crises. Yet the Kremlin is not only acting externally. At the same time, it is waging an equally dangerous internal war inside Europe – a war for minds and political will.
Putin’s Pacifists: How the Kremlin turns “peace” into a weapon against Europe
Under the slogan “Peace Now!” Russian intelligence services are working to paralyze Europe’s emerging defense resolve at the very moment it is finally beginning to rearm. According to Ukraine’s defense intelligence service (HUR) in February 2026, the Kremlin is actively coordinating large-scale campaigns through networks such as Germany’s Friedensbewegung against increased defense spending and further aid to Ukraine. These so-called peace activists are being mobilized for protests in the run-up to and during the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 13-15, 2026. This is not pacifism. It is a classic hybrid operation designed to make Europe relax once again and give the Kremlin what it needs most: time.
The authoritarian bloc as a co-conspirator in aggression
China remains the main economic and technological backbone of Russia’s war machine. As previously reported in Kyiv Post columns, Beijing supplies Moscow with critical electronics for FPV drones, engines, fiber-optics, sensors, and batteries. It helps Russia circumvent sanctions and uses the war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its technologies against NATO systems. At the same time, China is hedging its bets, preparing scenarios for a possible Russian collapse or breakup, and positioning itself to gain effective control over Russia’s Far East, parts of Siberia, the Arctic via the “Polar Silk Road,” and greater influence in Central Asia.
Meanwhile, North Korea has become a direct military participant, sending more than 12,000 troops and over 6 million artillery shells to Russia. This significantly raises the threat level for South Korea and Japan, as a battle-hardened, Chinese-backed North Korean army could dramatically increase provocations on the Korean Peninsula, in the Sea of Japan, and around Taiwan.
Iran poses even broader and more dangerous risks. Tehran has supplied Russia with thousands of Shahed kamikaze drones and hundreds of ballistic missiles worth approximately $2.7 billion, receiving in return Russian military technology and diplomatic cover for its nuclear program. If the aggressor escapes strategic defeat and real punishment, Iran will gain far greater freedom of action: it will intensify Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, strengthen support for Hezbollah and other proxies, and create a permanent threat to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf oil routes. This could trigger a new energy shock for Europe and a sharp rise in oil prices. In addition, Iran would move closer to the nuclear threshold under Russian protection.
From Taiwan to the Middle East, the foundations for a new wave of global conflicts are already in place. Any negotiations that allow Russia to avoid strategic defeat and accountability will only accelerate this process, sending a clear signal of democratic weakness to the entire authoritarian bloc.
Strategic defense as the only language the Kremlin understands
Based on the lessons of history, World War III could begin not with a shot, but with the grand signing of a piece of paper at the negotiating table that allows the aggressor to keep what it has seized. If the world accepts a quick peace without a genuine strategic defeat for the aggressor, it will only postpone the war, making the next conflict larger, more brutal, and far more costly for everyone. Concessions to the aggressor have never delivered lasting peace; they only determine where and when the next phase of the war will begin.
The situation will change fundamentally once Ukraine consistently inflicts 40,000-50,000 casualties per month on Russian forces and intercepts more than 80% of drones and missiles before they even reach the border. Only then will the aggressor feel the unbearable cost of continuing the war, and a real chance for a strong peace – not a capitulation disguised as a compromise – will emerge.
When Ukraine substantially strengthens its strategic defense and, together with its partners, builds a genuine regional security bloc in which the country is an indispensable part, it will give the democratic world a chance to preserve international rules and civilizational principles.
The only reliable formula for Ukraine’s security is the full recognition of its sovereignty and full membership in NATO. Only Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, reinforced by integrated intelligence, joint command, logistics, and the solidarity of 32 nations, creates a real deterrent effect. All other security models – so-called “Article 5-like” guarantees, bilateral treaties, or “coalitions of the willing” – remain dependent on the political will of governments at the moment of crisis, can be easily revoked by future administrations, lack the Alliance’s institutional infrastructure, and do not create the same psychological and military barrier for the Kremlin.
We learned this hard lesson at the very dawn of our independence: political declarations, memorandums, and assurances without genuine collective defense do not work. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the Minsk agreements, and all previous “guarantees” clearly showed that without a real defense mechanism, such documents become mere paper.
Ukraine can no longer afford risky experiments with formulas that sound strong but prove hollow when it matters most. That is why any new security agreement must be signed in Budapest, ideally on the back of the original 1994 Memorandum. This symbolic act will send a powerful political and moral signal: the world acknowledges past mistakes and corrects them.
If Ukraine is broken for the sake of a quick compromise, it will send a clear signal to all autocracies: the question will no longer be where the next war begins, but who will stand and who will fall first.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.