Ten years have passed since the spring of 2014, which became decisive for Ukraine. After the Revolution of Dignity, Russia – unable to accept the fact that pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych lost power after having fled the country and Ukraine would pursue a course of integration into the European community – shifted from lobbying its interests in Ukraine to open aggression against Ukraine.
The first victim of this aggression was Crimea, which was openly invaded by the Russian military, quickly blocking units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) located on the peninsula. Subsequently, Russia expanded its aggression to mainland Ukraine, activating its agents, inciting pro-Russian sentiments, exploiting linguistic and historical divisions, and speculating on historical issues in the international arena. All the actions of pro-Russian forces, supported by Russian agents, followed a familiar pattern:
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- Massive rallies to demonstrate “national” support for the pro-Russian movement.
- Deployment of “shock” groups bussed in from the Russian Federation, tasked with triggering violence and carrying out hostile actions.
- Seizure of authorities, typically the Regional Administration or the Regional Council, with the coerced participation of local deputies to vote on separation from Ukraine and request assistance from Russia.
- Provocation of street violence to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities.
Russian infiltration
Russia relied not only on a significant number of its agents and supporters, but also on a segment of the population, including supporters of former President Yanukovych who were dismayed by the Revolution of Dignity. This included law enforcement officers who did not support the revolution due to clashes between protesters and police on the Maidan. Russian propaganda labeled the revolution a “coup d’état” and the new government “illegitimate.” Local authorities in southeastern regions often proved passive and were infiltrated by Russian agents. They hesitated in restoring order in the streets, thereby enabling pro-Russian forces.
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Pro-Russian demonstrations took place in all major cities of southeastern Ukraine, mirroring, to a much lesser degree, the pro-Maidan demonstrations in Kyiv. However, in Odesa, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv, they faced resistance from pro-Ukrainian residents and law enforcement officers, while in Donetsk and Luhansk, they morphed into uprisings, plunging the cities into years of chaos, disenfranchisement, and war. Why did these events unfold differently in various regional centers? We spoke with participants from those regions.
Odesa
Odesa was a focal point for Russian influence, with Russia consistently appealing to its “Russianness” in history and supporting a cadre of pro-Russian deputies in local authorities, such as Alexander Vasyliev, Oleksyi Albu and Ihor Markov.
“The fate of not only Odesa but also Ukraine was decided here. The project, dubbed Novorossiya, aimed to gain access to the borders of Romania, unite with Transnistria, and cut Ukraine off from the sea,” local activist Vladyslav Balitskyi, who observed the events of spring 2014 in Odesa, told Kyiv Post.
We stand in Kulykove Pole Square near the city’s railway station, overlooking the House of Trade Unions.
It was here that a fire broke out on May 2, claiming the lives of several dozen members of the pro-Russian separatist movement in Odessa.
Russian propaganda exploited the fire, labeling it a crime and blaming Ukrainians. However, according to Balitskyi, it was the culmination of events in the city.
“On March 3, they attempted to seize the regional council, tore down the Ukrainian flag, and sought to coerce lawmakers to vote on several laws – granting special status and soliciting Russia’s aid. The process followed a familiar pattern. Had they succeeded on May 2, they would have consolidated their position in the city center, escalating tensions, and potentially replicating the Donetsk scenario,” Balitskyi said.
However, the lawmakers refused to comply with the rebels’ demands, leading to the establishment of a tent city on Kulykove Pole. By May 1, most of them had left.
“They had weakened. It’s no secret that some local government officials financially supported pro-Russian leaders who were primarily concerned about their own interests,” local activist Kateryna Madens said, suggesting a premeditated plan.
“The objective then, as in the current attacks on Odessa’s civilian infrastructure, was to sow chaos, destabilize the city, and create conditions conducive to Russia’s interests,” Madens added.
On May 2, pro-Ukrainian residents, along with football fans from Odesa and Kharkiv attending a match staged a march through the city center.
The rebels, with de facto police support, mobilized their supporters, who confronted the marchers outside the Trade Unions Building. Some pro-Russian individuals were armed. In one photograph, Vitaly Budko, a pro-Russian separatist leader nicknamed “Botsman” (Boatswain) is seen brandishing a Kalashnikov assault rifle.
The photo shows how Botsman was shooting from the police line.
Also chief of the Odesa police, Dmytro Fuchedzhy, was nearby, together with pro-Russian rebels.
Both fled to Russia after the events of that day. However, it was the Botsman who first shed blood in Odessa on May 2.
“The first casualty was Igor Ivanov, a Right Sector member, shot by a pro-Russian activist named Botsman, whose surname was Budko. Budko indiscriminately fired at journalists,” recounts Balitskyi.
In total, the separatists killed six pro-Ukrainian activists, but their rebellion swiftly faltered. Odesa residents flooded the streets in response to the gunfire, driving the pro-Russian separatists to retreat to the Kulykove Pole. There, they erected makeshift barricades and set ablaze tents and pallets with Molotov cocktails. A fire engulfed the Trade Unions Building.
Russian propaganda, exploiting the fire to fuel anti-Ukrainian sentiment, omitted critical details. It overlooked that the first six fatalities were from the pro-Ukrainian side, and that local police effectively aided pro-Russian forces. Moreover, the fire at the Trade Unions Building, as subsequent investigations determined, originated from within according to emergency servises.
Moreover, pro-Ukrainian activists on Kulykove Pole rescued dozens of their ideological opponents, using ladders and scaffolding. Numerous acts of heroism transpired that day, saving countless lives and quelling the pro-Russian movement in the city.
Kharkiv
In Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city about 40 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian border, Russia initially enjoyed greater success. The sequence of events mirrored those in Odessa, albeit with one crucial distinction: Russian forces managed to seize the Regional State Administration in March.
“Those who seized the Regional State Administration were mainly local miscreants, some were pro-Russian activists funded by Russia, and at least half were Russians bussed in from Belgorod and Rostov, neighboring regions. The border was porous and unguarded. Russia orchestrated and led this process,” Dmytro Bulakh, a participant in the events and a member of the Kharkiv City Council, told Kyiv Post.
Notably, Arsen Pavlov, also known as “Motorola,” who later emerged as a prominent figure in the separatist movement in Donetsk, was present in Kharkiv. Photographs from this period clearly depict him in the city center.
The situation was so dire that, according to journalist Inna Moskvyna, it appeared as though the Russians held sway over the city center.
“I witnessed Ukrainian citizens, including poet [Serhiy] Zhadan, being forcibly removed from the Regional Administration, subjected to violence and abuse. The attackers were extremely aggressive. Speaking Ukrainian in downtown Kharkiv was dangerous; you never knew what could happen them on the streets. Many of the imported Russians were easily identifiable by their dialect, their vehicles parked in lots, and even the hoisting of the Russian flag atop the seized Regional Administration was orchestrated by Russians, not Kharkiv separatists,” Moskvyna told Kyiv Post.
She notes that the influx of Russians into Kharkiv was facilitated by the visa-free regime between Ukraine and Russia at the time, coupled with the formal alliance between the two countries. Many Russians from border territories frequented Kharkiv on shopping trips.
Despite the inaction of law enforcement, which remained partially loyal to the ousted President Yanukovych, and the active presence of pro-Ukrainian activists, Kharkiv proved resistant to Russian influence. Some law enforcement agencies staunchly defended Ukraine’s constitutional order.
Additionally, local authorities, including the chairman of the Regional State Administration Mykhailo Dobkin, and Kharkiv mayor Hennadiy Kernes, attended pro-Russian rallies to pacify the crowds but refrained from aiding the pro-Russian rebels.
“In Kharkiv, elements of the elite opposed the movement, adopting a pro-Ukrainian stance, whereas a significant portion of society, including the sizable student population, took a more pro-Russian position. Moreover, a segment of the police force, reinforced by officers from other regions, supported the constitutional order. Mayor Kernes and other local authorities opted against stoking unrest, leading to the movement’s demise, with law enforcement ultimately prevailing,” Bulakh explained.
In late March 2014, remnants of the separatists were dispersed by Special Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from Vinnytsia.
Donetsk
Events in Donetsk unfolded differently. Here, direct intervention by armed Russians and the establishment of a quasi-state were pivotal.
Why did this scenario materialize? Denys Kazanskyi, a journalist and blogger native to Donetsk and a participant in the local Euromaidan, highlights the region’s proletarian character and the economic downturn resulting from mine closures. Consequently, Russian propaganda found fertile ground among disenfranchised residents of Ukraine’s Rust Belt.
“Donetsk and other cities in Donbas are more proletarian and economically depressed compared to Kharkiv and Odesa. So, Russian propaganda gained traction among the population more swiftly,” Kazanskyi said.
The region’s Russification during the Soviet era further contributed to this dynamic. Russian was more prevalent than Ukrainian as the language of communication, and Russian media enjoyed greater trust. Moreover, monopolistic control by party and law enforcement entities since the Soviet era, coupled with weak democratic traditions among the predominantly working-class populace, created the conditions where Russian influence could thrive.
“Donbas lacks the horizontal connections prevalent in other regions. While opposition parties and discussions were commonplace elsewhere, power in Donbas remained monopolized by a single party since Soviet times. In the spring of 2014, this monolithic pro-Russian regime fractured into two factions – an active pro-Russian camp and a passive pro-Ukrainian faction. Additionally, Russia had invested significant resources in nurturing pro-Russian sentiments in the Donbas over the years, deploying proxy forces armed with weapons, which exacerbated the situation further,” noted Valentyn Krasnoperov, who participated in pro-Ukrainian rallies in Donetsk in the spring of 2014.
He cites the “Donetsk Republic” organization, established in the mid-2000s, as an example. It was a group of pro-Russian marginals.
This movement served as the focal point for pro-Russian sentiment and received training and support from Russia, especially from Russian far-right groups, like here - together with the Eurasian Youth Union of Aleksandr Dugin.
Consequently, when the conflict erupted, pro-Russian elements in Donetsk were stronger than their pro-Ukrainian counterparts.
“Pro-Russian activists exhibited greater aggression, including individuals trained by Russia, prepared to resort to violence and even murder. Pro-Ukrainian activists, in contrast, primarily engaged in peaceful protests. Russian support, combined with partial backing from local elites and passive law enforcement, provided a significant advantage to the pro-Russian camp,” Krasnoperov told Kyiv Post.
Despite this advantage, overcoming pro-Ukrainian resistance proved challenging. Consequently, Russia resorted to overt aggression, dispatching columns of Russian special forces led by FSB Col. Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, who infiltrated cities north of Donetsk, including Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, with tacit support from local law enforcement.
Despite attempts to conceal their identities and pose as armed protesters, the Russians betrayed their origins through their dialect and accents. Notably, many hailed from the Caucasus, evident in photographs.
“The incursion of armed special forces across the Russian border, led by Girkin from Russia, ignited the conflict. He was the spark that ignited the war – a development absent in Kharkiv and Odesa,” Kazanskyi said.
Consequently, separatists, aided by Russian operatives, seized police arsenals and distributed weapons to anyone swayed by Russian propaganda. In response, the Ukrainian government declared an Anti-Terrorist Operation regime in the Donbas, prompting Russia to deploy additional troops and FSB units.
With that, the war started in earnest.
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