OPINION: Beijing, the Kremlin, and the Ukrainian Factor: What the West Has Yet to Notice

While the war in Ukraine remains a matter of physical survival, the world increasingly reads it as a catalyst for a major geopolitical realignment. It has become a global test of states’ ability to defend sovereignty, uphold international law, and maintain economic stability. One of the clearest signals of this global shift did not come from Washington or Brussels but from China.

On Dec. 15, 2025, Liu Sensen, an analyst based in Shanghai, published an article on NetEase, one of China’s key information platforms. NetEase does not run content that contradicts China’s core strategic interests, so even critical or ambivalent pieces carry significant weight.

Liu Sensen articulates how Russian turbulence creates a vacuum, opening space for Beijing’s strategic maneuvers. The text is not an official statement from the Chinese government, but it reflects the range of thought permitted regarding Russia, its regional role, and China’s positioning – making it well worth careful attention.

Russia’s Far East: vast territory with critical vulnerabilities

Liu Sensen immediately sets the scale: “Russia’s Far East covers nearly 7 million square kilometers (2.7 million square miles), almost 40% of the country’s territory, yet the population is under 8 million and shrinking.” The region is enormous but sparsely populated, and the war against Ukraine has only deepened the demographic crisis: combat-ready units have been sent west, and the military presence in the Far East has been reduced to a minimum. Liu warns: “If Russia ever experiences an internal rupture, this strategic region will be at risk.”

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The contrast with China’s Northeast is stark: across the border, over 100 million people live in a region with developed infrastructure and a strong economy, highlighting vast differences in mobility, adaptability, and human capital. Liu reminds readers that in the 19th century, territories were incorporated into empires through coercion and inequitable treaties, which strengthened control but left regions vulnerable if central authority weakened.

He emphasizes the strategic importance: “This 7-million square kilometer territory cannot be lost under any circumstances.” China views the region not just as an economic resource but as a political arena for expanding influence, particularly over key areas like Primorsky Krai, Ussuri, and Sakhalin. External actors are also critical: “The US and Japan are closely monitoring Russia’s Far East. China must prepare for the worst.” Liu points out Washington and Tokyo’s active interest, which compels Beijing to solidify its presence and economic control using energy and infrastructure projects as tools of influence.

China’s pragmatic integration

Liu stresses: “Control over flows, infrastructure, and markets is more important than formal sovereignty.” China is systematically integrating the region into its strategy: a third of Russia’s coal and water reserves, 30% of its forest resources, along with gold, diamonds, platinum, oil, and gas, are being brought into Beijing’s economic and strategic logic. Yakutia produces 25% of the world’s diamonds, and the Kovykta gas field contains 1.8 trillion cubic meters of gas.

China signs long-term contracts and builds infrastructure: the Power of Siberia pipeline delivers up to 380 billion cubic meters of gas annually, and a memorandum signed in 2025 outlines the construction of Power of Siberia 2, projected to deliver 50 billion cubic meters per year via Mongolia. Actual implementation depends on commercial agreements, financing, and construction, with supply realistically starting no earlier than 2030-31. Liu emphasizes that China maintains flexibility and control over key resources: “Today China has sufficient economic and strategic assets to cement its position in this territory. Controlling key resources is more important than nominal status.”

Infrastructure investment goes beyond energy: China actively invests in roads, bridges, ports, and local enterprises, providing technology, jobs, and broader use of the yuan. This creates de facto control over the regional economy, a key instrument of political influence without formal annexation.

Russian Federation’s internal fragility and the Budanov map

It is also crucial to understand that China is already using Russia as a proxy. At the same time, it is modernizing its military potential and gradually increasing its political and economic presence within the Russian Federation. Control over resources, infrastructure, and strategic points is expanding quietly. The current Kremlin regime and its inherited imperial logic leave no room for democratization of the Russian Federation or sustainable economic and social development of its regions. The center is focused not on development but on maintaining control, which condemns the periphery to degradation, dependence, and mounting internal tensions.

In this context, the famous Budanov Map takes on a new meaning. Once dismissed as a meme or trolling, it is neither about imaginary borders nor fantasies. The map depicts the internal structure of the Russian Empire, showing that it consists of different regions with distinct economic, ethnic, and historical characteristics. It highlights where the Kremlin holds power and where regions are potentially weak and autonomous, susceptible to destabilization if central authority falters. Essentially, the map visualizes tension points and potential disintegration: areas where conflicts, civil wars, local separatism, or other crises could emerge. In other words, the Russian Federation holds together only through the centralized power of the Kremlin, which is severely strained by the war in Ukraine, as the criminal Kremlin regime has diverted all resources to achieving its so-called “special military operation” objectives.

This is a matter of time and form: civil wars, internal conflicts in the periphery, and palace coups in the Kremlin could trigger a chain reaction of disintegration at any moment. In this context, attempts by the US to manage the region in its own interests through territorial concessions or by effectively sacrificing Ukraine’s sovereignty to Russia appear dangerous, delusional and bloody. Continuing such a policy would only weaken the West’s position and sharply increase existing threats in Europe.

For the West, a proactive approach is critical.

The illusion that the problem can be “waited out” or managed through concessions by Ukraine only brings the scenario of global instability closer. Supporting Ukraine, preparing for potential scenarios of Russian Federation fragmentation, and coordinating actions with allies in the region is not about morality or goodwill. It is about the long-term security of Europe, the transatlantic alliance, and the ability of the US and EU to counter Beijing’s monopolistic ambitions in a region critical to global stability.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.