Just several weeks after the US announced a Memorandum of Understanding with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the war that began in late February appears to be entering a new phase of hostilities.
Renewed US and Iranian strikes, heavy rhetoric from US President Donald Trump at the recent NATO summit in Ankara, attacks on American facilities across the Gulf, and a sharp decline in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz suggest that the agreement has not stabilized the region.
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For Ukraine, whose government considers Iran an enemy state because of Tehran’s military assistance to Russia and thus becomes an indirect participant in this conflict, the story offers several important lessons as a new wave of escalation appears to be unfolding.
Lesson 1: Superpowers miscalculate too
The Iran war began with significant early successes for the US-Israeli side.
Over several days, the joint operation, during which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior figures were reportedly killed, demonstrated overwhelming military superiority. While it remains unclear which side was responsible for specific parts of the operation, Iran’s regime appeared vulnerable.
Key infrastructure, including on Kharg Island, was damaged, with Israeli politicians, including Likud’s Amir Weitmann, telling Kyiv Post that the war was exceeding expectations.
But as the conflict unfolded, it exposed several uncomfortable realities.
One was the apparent lack of preparation for second-order effects, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian retaliation against Gulf states. As a result, Tehran quickly acquired leverage despite its military setbacks, not least through the resulting spike in oil prices and fears of a wider regional economic crisis.
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For Ukraine, this shows that Russia is not the only power capable of strategic misjudgment.
The Kremlin badly miscalculated its attempt at a blitzkrieg in Ukraine, but more experienced and better-resourced actors, including the US and Israel, can miscalculate too.
The Trump administration may have been encouraged by its earlier capture of Venezuelan ruler Nicolás Maduro, but Iran has proven to be a far more difficult case. Unlike Russia in Ukraine, where the Kremlin chose immediate escalation after its initial failure, Washington now appears to be weighing whether to further intensify its military campaign.
Lesson 2: America is not a “friend” to anyone
Unlike Ukraine, the US and Israel have enjoyed decades of robust military, intelligence, and technological cooperation. For Washington, Israel remains its key strategic partner in the Middle East.
Yet the Iran war demonstrated once again that American interests prevail over other considerations, especially during election cycles.
Even though Israel fought alongside the US and took direct risks, Washington still chose to negotiate the now-unraveling memorandum without it and, according to reports, declined to share the details of the document with the Israeli side.
“Trump’s approval rating is low and the midterms are looming. The Republicans will likely lose the majority in the House of Representatives and perhaps even in the Senate. An impeachment procedure is not impossible, even if it does not result in his removal,” says Dr. Ariel Cohen, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
For Ukraine, which once relied on the infamous 1994 Budapest Memorandum for its security, the lesson is significant.
Washington is willing to negotiate not only with adversaries such as Russia, but also with regimes it considers enemies, including Iran. How it does so will almost certainly depend on its own interests, domestic pressures, and electoral cycles.
Lesson 3: NATO unity is questionable
At the beginning of the war, the US did not fully coordinate its actions with all NATO partners.
Later, however, Washington asked NATO and European partners to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz and manage the consequences of the conflict.
Article 5 was never triggered, and NATO member states were technically not obliged to step in. But that is precisely the point.
Even when the war affected their own interests – not least through an oil price spike that benefited Russia and threatened supply chains – NATO member states still pursued their own policies.
Spain, arguably one of NATO’s less reliable member states and one that has yet to meet the alliance’s 2% defense spending target, denied the US use of Spanish bases and airspace for Iran-related operations.
Italy reportedly denied US military aircraft access to Sigonella airbase.
Trump’s fiery threat to halt trade with Madrid only intensified the dispute.
“In such wars, coalitions are necessary. Trump has marred relations with Europe, including because of his desire to grab Greenland from the Danish Kingdom. Plus, there is the rift between the US and Europe over Ukraine,” says Dr. Ariel Cohen.
For Ukraine, this should prompt reflection on what the Alliance offers in practice, rather than only on paper.
Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations have been effectively shelved, even as the latest NATO summit recognized Kyiv’s security contribution. At the same time, the alliance’s adequacy for modern warfare – given its more than 30 member states, widely varying interests and high costs – is increasingly open to question.
Lesson 4: The Middle East requires extra sensitivity
The Iran war created an unprecedented diplomatic opening for Ukraine.
Both Israel and the Gulf states turned to Kyiv for assistance against Iran’s chief weapon: Shahed drones.
Experts Kyiv Post spoke to, including Qatar-based Dr. Omar Ashour, noted that Ukraine has developed unique experience countering Iranian-made drones in real battlefield conditions and at a much lower cost.
President Volodymyr Zelensky’s Middle East tour was regarded as a success, with Deputy Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council David Aloyan saying that around 200 Ukrainian specialists were operating successfully in the region.
But there is also a downside.
Kyiv’s growing ties with Gulf states have caused unease in Israel, another key Middle Eastern partner. While Israel has provided limited, though still notable, help to Ukraine, its dissatisfaction with some of Kyiv’s diplomatic conduct is not entirely unfounded.
Just as Ukraine believes Israel should curb its ties with Russia, Jerusalem believes Ukraine should align its public positions more clearly with Israeli interests, including at the UN; exercise greater caution in its engagement with Qatar, given Doha’s controversial role as a mediator and financial channel in Gaza; and avoid singling out Israel publicly while treating similar conduct by countries such as Türkiye and Syria more cautiously.
The grain dispute over shipments to Haifa, which Kyiv says contained grain stolen from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, is an especially vivid example.
While both sides pointed fingers at each other, the broader lesson for Ukraine is clear: If Kyiv seeks deeper cooperation with Jerusalem – not least because of strong societal ties between the two countries – it must approach such an embattled region with greater diplomatic finesse.
Lesson 5: Russia’s global reach is limited
The Islamic Republic of Iran is arguably Russia’s last major stronghold in the region following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in 2024.
Yet despite years of partnership and a comprehensive cooperation agreement between Moscow and Tehran, Russia failed to meaningfully assist Iran when it mattered most.
Beyond intelligence, limited logistical assistance and political support, Moscow did not intervene directly, deter the US, or prevent Israel from striking Iranian targets.
Nor did Russia persuade Washington with its reported offer to stop providing intelligence to Iran in exchange for Washington halting intelligence support to Ukraine. It also failed to use its remaining influence over Tehran as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the Trump administration, which remains eager to end the Ukraine war on terms it considers acceptable to US interests.
For Ukraine, this offers a revealing insight.
While it is not in Russia’s long-term interest to lose allied regimes, Moscow has shown that, when necessary, it is willing to accept short-term losses among key partners.
That is largely because Russia benefited from the oil price spike and from the diversion of attention and resources away from its war against Ukraine.
This suggests that the so-called Axis of Evil – Russia, Iran, China, which largely stayed away from the conflict and even hosted Trump in mid-May, and North Korea – may be less robust than previously assumed.
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Unsurprisingly, the new deal proved insufficient for Israel, the Gulf states, and anyone who understands that Iran’s regime has not abandoned its strategic ambition of developing a nuclear weapon.
For Ukraine, this is a warning.
While Kyiv has arguably benefited from the conflict by building a wider regional architecture, several issues remain important.
The first is diplomatic tone.
Ukraine’s diplomacy has improved immensely over the years. But its current emphasis on public messaging, while capable of producing headlines and sometimes serving Ukraine’s interests, can also complicate state-level communication.
Unlike the Gulf states, Israel is a democracy and is expected to hold elections this fall. Kyiv must be prepared to communicate effectively with Jerusalem regardless of whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose government has maintained restrained relations with Kyiv, remains in power or the opposition takes over.
The second issue is reducing reliance on the US – not only politically or symbolically, but also in terms of military procurement.
Whether a larger escalation comes after the midterms, which would give the US at least one year before the presidential campaign begins, or later, depending on the new political configuration, Washington is unlikely to dramatically change its approach.
This creates risks primarily for US military capacity even if Kyiv manages to produce licensed Patriot interceptors. Cohen said that “40 days of bombing and shooting in the Persian Gulf,” during which many arsenals were depleted by 40 or even 50%, showed that current procurement levels are “absolutely insufficient.”
“It is impossible to wage a modern war – a war involving drones, Tomahawks, Patriot and THAAD air defense systems, and other advanced weapons – with such limited reserves and such small arsenals,” says Dr. Ariel Cohen.
“Now imagine, God forbid, that war breaks out simultaneously in three theaters: in Europe, Russia invades one of the NATO countries, and NATO states begin trying to resist it; in the Middle East, something similar may still happen – and perhaps not in the distant future; and the most dangerous scenario of all would be a war over Taiwan, a war in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and beyond,” Cohen added.
Ukraine should take that scenario seriously.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
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